International Law: An Appropriate Compensation Standard for Nationalized Property: Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank by Editorial Board, Minn. L. Rev.
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review
1982
International Law: An Appropriate Compensation
Standard for Nationalized Property: Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank
Minn. L. Rev. Editorial Board
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Editorial Board, Minn. L. Rev., "International Law: An Appropriate Compensation Standard for Nationalized Property: Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank" (1982). Minnesota Law Review. 3173.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/3173
International Law: An "Appropriate" Compensation
Standard for Nationalized Property: Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank
On July 6, 1960, the government of Cuba enacted Law No.
851,1 nationalizing all businesses in Cuba owned by United
States citizens.2 In September 1960, acting pursuant to Law No.
851, Banco Nacional de Cuba, the central bank of Cuba, took
over the two Cuban branches of Chase Manhattan Bank.
Chase responded by selling $17.2 million in securities pledged
by Banco Nacional to secure an outstanding $10 million loan
from Chase and by retaining the surplus to offset the loss of its
Cuban branches, which it valued at $8.6 million. Banco Na-
cional then brought suit in the Southern District of New York
to recover $7.2 million in surplus collateral and its $2.5 million
deposit with Chase. Chase counterclaimed for the expropria-
tion 3 of its Cuban branches, asking for a setoff against Banco
Nacionars claim.4 The district court permitted the setoff for
1. Law No. 851, July 6, 1960, 2 La Jurisprudencia al Dia (legislacion) 1162
Cuba, reprinted in 55 AM. J. INr'L L. 822 (1961).
2. The nationalizations that followed the Cuban Revolution have gener-
ated extensive litigation before the United States Foreign Claims Settlement
Commission and United States courts. The Cuban nationalizations actually oc-
curred in three major waves. The first wave began with the Agrarian Reform
Act of 1959, which authorized the seizure of large land holdings in Cuba for dis-
tribution to landless peasants. The second occurred after Cuba enacted Law
No. 851 in retaliation for President Eisenhower's decision to reduce Cuba's
sugar import quota. The enactment of Laws Nos. 890 and 891 on October 13,
1960, marked the last wave. These last decrees primarily affected Cubans, be-
cause the Cuban government had seized most American-owned property under
either the Agrarian Reform Act or Law No. 851. See Rafat, Legal Aspects of the
Cuban Expropriation of American-Owned Property, 11 ST. Lois U.L.J. 45, 45-
48 (1966).
3. This Comment uses the word "expropriation" interchangeably with
"deprivation" and "nationalization." In general, these terms refer to any "state
action against private alien wealth over which States claim jurisdictional com-
petence, totally or partially depriving alien owners of title or controL" Dawson
& Weston, "Promp Adequate and Effective" A Universal Standard of Compen-
sation?, 30 FORDHAM L. REV. 727, 727 n.1 (1962).
4. Chase asserted a second counterclaim as trustee for $4 million of rail-
road equipment that it had leased to two Cuban railroad companies national-
ized on October 13, 1960. Both the district court and the appellate court
rejected this counterclaim because Banco Nacional was not an "opposing
party" to the counterclaim, as required by FED. R. Civ. P. 13(b). Banco Na-
cional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 658 F.2d 875, 885-87 (2d Cir. 1981).
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Chase's loss of its Cuban branches, which the court valued at
$6.9 million, and granted Banco Nacional judgment for $2.8 mil-
lion.5 On appeal, Banco Nacional argued that international law
does not require a sovereign state to pay full compensation for
an act of expropriation pursuant to its sovereign power to re-
form its social and economic structure, and that the district
court erroneously valued the expropriated branches according
to their value as going concerns. 6 The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit rejected Banco Nacional's first objection to the
lower court's judgment, holding that Chase was entitled under
international law to compensation equal to the full value of its
expropriated Cuban branches. 7 The court nevertheless re-
duced Chase's setoff to $5.4 million in accordance with Banco
Nacional's second objection, finding that Chase would receive
full compensation under the above standard by valuing the ex-
propriated branches at their net asset value rather than their
going concern value.8 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Man-
hattan Bank, 658 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1981).
When a question of right based on international law is
before a United States court, that court must ascertain and ad-
minister the international law as part of United States law.9
Treaties and custom are the principal sources of international
law.'0 The United States Supreme Court has recognized this
by directing courts to apply "the customs and usages of civi-
lized nations" as international law when no treaty exists."1
5. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 505 F. Supp. 412
(S.D.N.Y. 1980), modified, 658 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1981).
6. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 658 F.2d 875, 887
(2d Cir. 1981).
7. Id. at 892-93.
8. Id. at 894. The Cuban Assets Control Regulations have frozen all Cu-
ban assets in the United States. See 31 C.F.R. § 515.201 (1981). As a result, the
court ordered the proceeds of Banco Nacional's recovery paid over to federal
authorities pursuant to the Cuban Assets Control Regulations. See 658 F.2d at
894.
9. The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). See infra note 11.
10. 1 L. OPPENHEnvI, INTERNATIONAL LAw § 19, at 29 (8th ed. 1955). This pri-
ority is implicitly recognized in article 38 of the Statute of the International
Court which directs the International Court to first apply "international con-
ventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized
by the contesting states." After conventional law, the statute then directs the
International Court to apply "international custom as evidence of a general
practice accepted as law." U.N. CHARTER, STAT. OF LC.J. art. 38.
11. The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). In The Paquette Ha-
bana, the masters of two Spanish fishing vessels sued to recover the proceeds
of the sale of the vessels after their capture by a United States blockading
squadron off the coast of Cuba during the Spanish-American War. The Court
held that the seizure violated international law, declaring that "[b]y an ancient
usage among civilized nations, . . . coast fishing vessels, pursuing their voca-
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Since no treaty recognized by both the United States and Cuba
controls the issue of compensation for expropriated property, a
court must resort to the customary international law for the ap-
plicable standard of review. As a source of international law,
custom refers to the habitual behavior of states acting under
the conviction that such behavior is obligatory or proper under
international law.'2 Custom requires uniformity in the practice
of states as evidenced by their domestic laws, treaties, and ac-
tions. It establishes an international norm when such uniform-
ity of practice becomes sufficiently widespread that it creates
reasonable community-wide expectations associated with legal
prescription.13 The generally accepted view is, however, that
customary international law is not binding on any state refus-
ing to accept it.14 But when a customary practice establishes
an international norm between two countries acknowledging it,
it assumes the full force of international law.' 5
During the twentieth century, scholars' 6 have identified at
least five different standards of compensation for expropriated
alien-owned property, all of which various countries have
tion of catching and bringing in fresh fish, have been recognized as exempt,
with their cargoes and crews, from capture as prize of war." Id. at 686.
12. 1 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 10, § 17, at 26. The International Court of
Justice stated the requirements of custom in international law as follows: "The
Party which relies on custom ... must prove that this custom... is in accord-
ance with a constant and uniform usage practised by the States in question,
and that this usage is the expression of a right appertaining to the State grant-
ing asylum and a duty incumbent on the territorial State." Asylum (Colom. v.
Peru), 1950 LC.J. 266, 276 (Judgment of Nov. 20). See also W. LEvi, CoNTEMPo-
RARY INTERNATIONAL LAw: A CONCISE INTRODUCTION 3341 (1979).
13. Raman, Toward a General Theory of International Customary Law, in
TOWARD WORLD ORDER AND HuMAN DIGNrrY 365, 368-69 (M. Reisman & B. Wes-
ton eds. 1976). Commentators have often said that there is a time element in-
herent in the term "custom." Modern technology, however, affects expectations
regarding the duration of a particular state practice alleged to be customary in-
ternational law. Because modern means of communication have removed the
reasons for the time requirement, commentators now assert that customary in-
ternational law can be established within a relatively short period of time. See,
e.g., W. LEVI, supra note 12, at 39.
14. The International Court of Justice confirmed this view in Fisheries
(U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 LC.J. 116, 138-39 (Judgment of Dec. 18). See W. LEvI, supra
note 12, at 41.
15. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that
custom established an international norm forbidding the use of torture against
a state's own nationals).
16. In The Paquette Habana, the Supreme Court said that United States
courts should examine the writings of jurists and commentators as evidence of
the existence of customary international law. 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). The Stat-
ute of the International Court provides that general legal principles recognized
by civilized nations, judicial decisions, and the most highly qualified writers of
the various countries are means for determining international law, if neither in-
ternational treaties nor custom exists. U.N. CHARTER, STAT. OF I.C.J. art. 38.
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claimed represent customary international law.i7 The first
standard, commonly identified with the Soviet bloc countries,
denies the obligation of a nationalizing state to pay compensa-
tion to a deprived alien.18 The Soviet bloc countries consider
the act of expropriation to be the exclusive internal concern of
the nationalizing state, and hence not subject to review before
international tribunals. 19 Although this standard is rarely used
outside the communist world, Mexico adopted essentially this
position in its dispute with the United States over the Mexican
agrarian and oil expropriations.20 Recognizing, however, the al-
most universal acknowledgment of the principle of compensa-
tion in the noncommunist world, most writers have concluded
that a standard imposing no duty on a nationalizing state to
pay at least some compensation is not sufficiently uniform to
create the reasonable community-wide expectations necessary
to acquire the status of customary international law.2 1
17. The classical standard of customary international law which prevailed
until the early decades of this century was one of "[r]estitution in kind, or, if
this is not possible, payment of a sum corresponding to the value which a resti-
tution in kind would bear." Chorzow Factory (Ger. v. PoL), 1928 P.C.LJ., ser. A.,
No. 17, at 47 (Judgment of Sept. 13).
18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNrTED
STATES § 185 reporter's note 3 (1965) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT].
19. The Hungarian delegate to the United Nations summed up the Com-
munist position: "Any decision relating to whether and how much compensa-
tion should be paid was essentially an internal affair of the state concerned,
which therefore was sole judge in the matter and could brook no outside inter-
ference whatever in the exercise of its sovereignty." 17 U.N. GAOR C.2 (846th
mtg.) at 297, U.N. Doc. A/C.2/SR.846 (1962).
20. Rafat, Compensation for Expropriated Property in Recent International
Law, 14 Vni. L. REv. 199, 202 (1969). In 1925, acting under provisions of the
Mexican Constitution, which declared that the Mexican government owned all
national lands, Mexico enacted a land reform law limiting the amount of land
which any foreign land owner could hold. As a result, land of American owners
that exceeded the statutory limit was seized. By executive decree in 1938, Mex-
ico also seized all foreign-owned oil properties in Mexico. The United States
Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, intervened on behalf of the deprived American
land owners and oil companies by sending a note to the Mexican Foreign Min-
ister demanding "prompt, adequate, and effective payment" for the seized
properties. Mexico argued that no international law obligated it to pay compen-
sation for extensive takings of this nature and that any recovery would have to
be determined under Mexican law. Mexico eventually settled the disputes with
the United States by agreeing to pay $40 million to the American landowners
and $24 million, plus interest, to the American oil companies. See Dawson &
Weston, supra note 3, at 740-41. See also Hudson, The Expropriation of Oil
Properties by Mexico, 32 AM. J. TNT'L L. 519 (1938).
21. See, e.g., G. WHrTE, NATIONALmZATION OF FOREIGN PROPERTY 231-43
(1961); B. WORTLEY, EXPROPRIATION IN PUBiUC INTERNATIONAL LAW 115-35
(1959); Domke, Foreign Nationalizations, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 585, 603-04 (1961).
Even though the Soviet bloc countries claim to reject the principle of com-
pensation, they do at least accept the need for compensation both in their do-
mestic legislation and in their international agreements. See Seidl-
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The developing countries of Latin America generally es-
pouse a position closely related to the Soviet bloc standard.
These countries maintain that international law imposes no
duty on a nationalizing state to pay compensation apart from
its general duty under international law to grant a deprived
alien property owner equality of treatment with its own nation-
als.22 Under this view, a claim for compensation arises under
international law only if the nationalizing state pays compensa-
tion to its own nationals under similar circumstances. The con-
tinued vitality of the Latin American position is doubtful,
however, due to Latin America's recent support of United Na-
tions resolutions basing the right to compensation on interna-
tionally developed criteria as a matter of international right,
rather than on purely local criteria as a matter of local right.23
The United States adopted the so-called orthodox position
enunciated in the celebrated note from Secretary of State
Cordell Hull to the Mexican Foreign Minister during the con-
troversy over the Meican oil and agrarian expropriations.2 4
The Hull note stated that "under every rule of law and equity,
Hohenveldern, Communist Theories on Confiscation and Expropriation: Criti-
cal Comments, 7 AM. J. Comp. L. 541 (1959). See also G. WHrrE, supra, at 232-34;
Katzarov, The Validity of the Act of Nationalisation in International Law, 22
MOD. L. REv. 639, 647 (1959). Although the Soviet Union engaged in extensive
nationalizations following the Bolshevik Revolution without acknowledging a
duty to afford compensation for nationalized alien property, most of the nation-
alization laws enacted between 1945 and 1949 in East European communist
countries did provide for some compensation. See Dawson & Weston, supra
note 3, at 742. Virtually all these communist countries, including the Soviet
Union, have entered into international claims settlement agreements with the
United States and other countries under which they have agreed to pay some
compensation for nationalized alien-owned property. See generally Doman,
Postwar Nationalization of Foreign Property in Europe, 48 CoLual. L. REV. 1125
(1948); Doman, Compensation for Nationalized Property in Post-War Europe, 3
INT'L L. Q. 323 (1950). Most of these countries have also accepted a duty to
compensate for takings of alien-owned property in their bilateral trade agree-
ments with several Western countries. See Committee on Int'l Law, The Com-
pensation Requirement in the Taking of Alien Property, 22 REC. A.B. Crry N.Y.
195, app. III, pt. B (1967) (from 1945 to 1967 over 50 treaties between communist
and Western countries recognized the duty to pay compensation).
22. RESTATEMENT, supra note 18, § 185 reporter's note 2. The equality of
treatment standard has been the position of a number of authorities who con-
clude that there is no absolute rule of international law forbidding the taking of
an alien's property without compensation. E.g., J. BRmRLY, THE Law OF NA-
TIONS 284-85 (6th ed. 1963); S. FRIEDMAN, EXPROPRIATION IN INTERNATIONAL Lw
210 (1953); Williams, International Law and the Property of Aliens, 9 Brrr. Y.B.
INT'L L. 1 (1928).
23. See, e.g., infra notes 37-38 and accompanying text. Resolution 1803 re-
quired that compensation be paid in accordance with international standards,
rather than the standards of the nationalizing state. GAL Res. 1803, 17 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 15, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962).
24. See supra note 20.
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no government is entitled to expropriate private property, for
whatever purpose, without provision for prompt, adequate, and
effective payment therefor."25 The trinity of "prompt, adequate,
and effective" compensation requires that compensation be
paid within a reasonable time, in an amount equal to the full
value of the property taken, and in a medium of exchange real-
izable by the deprived alien.26 In 1963, the United States codi-
fied the orthodox position in the Hickenlooper Amendment,
which requires the President to suspend foreign aid to any
country nationalizing property of United States citizens with-
out provision for "speedy compensation for such property in
convertible foreign exchange, equivalent to the full value
thereof."27
Some of the most preeminent scholars of international
law28 contend that modern international claims settlement
practice has modified the orthodox standard, at least in the
context of the modern extensive expropriation in pursuance of
a major reform of a country's social and economic structure.29
Under this fourth standard, customary international law re-
quires payment of only partial compensation to the deprived
25. Note of Secretary of State Hull, Aug. 22, 1938, Press Releases, U.S.
Dep't of State, Vol. 19, No. 465, at 138, reprinted in 5 DEP'T OF STATE, FOREIGN
RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, Dn'LomAic PAPERS 1938, THE AMEmcAN RE-
PUBucs 685, 687 (1956).
26. RESTATEMENT, supra note 18, at § 187.
27. Foreign Assistance Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-205, § 301(e)(2), 77 Stat.
379, 387 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e) (1) (1976)).
28. See, e.g., W. GOuLD, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAw 467
(1957); 1 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 10, § 155d, at 352; Delson, Nationalization of
the Suez Canal Company: Issues of Public and Private International Law, 57
COLUM. L. REV. 755, 765-66 (1957).
29. The orthodox position should be rejected in the context of extensive
deprivation. Actually, international law has probably never required strict ad-
herence to the orthodox trinity in the case of extensive deprivation, at least as
the drafters of the Hickenlooper Amendment understood the orthodox position.
See Panel: T7e Taking of Property: Evaluation of Damages, 62 AM. Soc'Y INT'L
L. PRoc. 35, 43-44 (1968). Courts have modified the principle of "speedy" com-
pensation so that deferred compensation is now accepted in the extensive dep-
rivation context. See, e.g., N.V. Verinegde Deli-Maatschappijen v. Deutsch-
Indonesische Tabak-Handelsgesellschaft, 28 IL.R. 16 (Bremen, W. Ger. Ct. App.
1959) (holding that the time and amount of compensation must be made in ac-
cordance with the conditions in the expropriating state). The lump sum settle-
ment practice of the twentieth century and the large body of informed
publicists who assert that partial compensation has become the modern norm
undermine the principle that full compensation is required. See authorities
cited supra note 28. And even the "effective" nature of payment is a matter of
considerable contemporary uncertainty. See Dawson & Weston, supra note 3,
at 739; Muller, Compensation for Nationalization: A North-South Dialogue, 19
COLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 35, 46-49 (1981).
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alien.30 The partial compensation standard recognizes that, if
the orthodox requirement of full compensation were applied to
extensive expropriations, it would give the developed countries
a veto over attempts by developing states to undertake funda-
mental reform of their economic and social structures. 31 More-
over, adherents of partial compensation argue that their view is
more consistent than the orthodox position with contemporary
international practice.32 To substantiate their argument, partial
compensation supporters rely on the predominant post-World
War H practice of settling international claims controversies in-
volving extensive expropriations through the use of the lump
sum settlement device rather than through international adju-
dication.33 The postwar lump sum settlements between capital
exporting states negotiating on behalf of their deprived nation-
als and the nationalizing states demonstrate that even the
Western market states have settled for less than full value of
the expropriated property in a substantial number of cases.34
Nevertheless, the partial compensation view is merely a gener-
alization of past state practice rather than a statement of an ac-
cepted legal standard that is capable of reconciling postwar
settlement agreements, which have ranged from minimal com-
pensation in some cases to almost full compensation in
others.35
30. This was essentially the position argued by Banco Nacional in Chase
Manhattan, 658 F.2d at 892.
31. See Dunn, International Law and Private Property Rights, 28 COLUM.
L. REV. 166, 178 (1928).
32. Dawson & Weston, supra note 3, at 738. Accord Weigel & Weston, Valu-
ation Upon the Deprivation of Foreign Enterprise: A Policy-Oriented Approach
to the Problem of Compensation Under International Law, in 1 THE VALUATION
OF NATIONALIZED PROPERTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 8-11 (R. Lillich ed. 1972).
33. Although the lump sum settlement practice has some antecedents in
the prewar period, the unprecedented number of nationalizations marking the
immediate post-World War II period in Europe established the practice. Since
World War II, states have concluded more .than 150 lump sum agreements rep-
resenting about 95 percent of the international claims practice during the pe-
riod. 1 R. LILLCH & B. WESTON, INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS: THEIR SETTLEMENT BY
LuMP SuM AGREEMENTS 4 (1975).
34. Id. at 239. These agreements demonstrate that the lump sum compen-
sation provided by Western countries has failed to meet the orthodox test of
adequacy. For example, the United States-Rumanian settlement netted the
United States $24,526,370, of which $22,020,370 came from Rumanian assets fro-
zen in the United States, to satisfy claims adjudicated by the Foreign Claims
Settlement Commission at $84,729,291. Dawson & Weston, supra note 3, at 743.
The largest percentage recovered by postwar French lump sum settlements
was 60.6 percent of "recognized claims." B. WESTON, INTERNATIONAL CLAIMs:
POsTwAR FRENCH PRACTICE 179 (1971).
35. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 658 F.2d at 892.
Not every lump sum settlement agreement resulted in partial compensation.
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In 1962, the United Nations General Assembly debated
these diverse standards in connection with Resolution 1803 en-
titled "Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Re-
sources." 36 The resulting compromise resolution created a fifth
standard for measuring the extent of the duty under interna-
tional law to pay compensation for expropriated property. Par-
agraph 4 of Resolution 1803 provides:
Nationalization, expropriation or requisitioning shall be based on
grounds or reasons of public utility, security or the national interest
which are recognized as overriding purely individual or private inter-
ests, both domestic and foreign. In such cases the owner shall be paid
appropriate compensation, in accordance with the rules in force in the
State taking such measures in the exercise of its sovereignty and in ac-
cordance with international law. In any case where the question of
compensation gives rise to a controversy, the national jurisdiction of
the State taking such measures shall be exhausted. However, upon
agreement by sovereign States and other parties concerned, settlement
of the dispute should be made through arbitration or international
adjudication.3 7
Approval was overwhelming only France and South Africa
voted against the resolution, with most communist countries,
including Cuba, abstaining.38 Paradoxically, the compromise
resolution purported to state a new requirement of "appropri-
ate" compensation for expropriated property, while simultane-
ously reaffirming adherence to international law. This
ambiguity allowed some Western diplomats to argue that the
reference to international law reaffirmed the orthodox position
and that appropriate compensation meant "prompt, adequate,
and effective" compensation.3 9
In 1974, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Res-
olution 3281, the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of
States.40 Article 2, paragraph 2(c) of Resolution 3281 declares
that all states have the right to nationalize property within
For example, in the Anglo-Iranian Consortium Agreement of 1954, it is arguable
that the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. received full compensation for losses stemming
from the 1951 Iranian nationalization of its oil industry. See, e.g., Rafat, supra
note 20, at 232. On the other hand, in the Franco-Bulgarian settlement of 1955,
the French recovered only 4.59 percent of the value of its claims against Bulga-
ria, as determined by France's Bulgarian claims program. B. WESTON, supra
note 34, at 179.
36. G.A. Res. 1803, 17 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 15, U.N. Doc. A/5217
(1962).
37. Id. (emphasis added).
38. 17(3) U.N. GAOR (1194th plen. mtg.) at 1134, U.N. Doc. A/PV.1194
(1962).
39. See Schwebel, The Story of the U.N.'s Declaration on Permanent Sover-
eignty Over Natural Resources, 49 A.B.A. J. 463, 465 (1963).
40. GA. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631
(1974).
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their jurisdictions "in which case appropriate compensation
should be paid by the State adopting such measures, taking
into account its relevant laws and regulations and all circum-
stances that the State considers pertinent."41 In contrast to
Resolution 1803, however, the General Assembly adopted Reso-
lution 3281 with most Western countries, including the United
States, opposed or abstaining.42 Resolution 3281 deleted the
reference to international law contained in Resolution 1803 and
appeared to authorize the nationalizing state to determine uni-
laterally the appropriate compensation.43
Because four of the five standards discussed above in re-
gard to expropriated property lack sufficient contemporary
precedents or legal significance to constitute a modern custom-
ary practice of international law,44 the duty of appropriate com-
pensation enunciated in Resolutions 1803 and 3281 is the only
widely recognized limitation on state action against foreign-
owned property. Although authorities disagree about the legal
effect of General Assembly resolutions, few deny their impact
on customary international law insofar as they create commu-
nity-wide expectations that may produce legal prescription. 45
That is, reasonable expectations are created not only by unifor-
mities in the conduct of states, but also by uniformities in their
statements or formal declarations.46 These declarations play an
especially significant role in creating reasonable expectations if
there is some correlation between what states say and what
states do. Thus, when there is concomitant state practice, the
norm generating influence emanating from a statement cast in
the form of a formal United Nations declaration may create the
expectation that it has become binding on states as customary
international law.47
41. Id.
42. The final vote was 120 for, 6 against, and 10 abstentions. 29 U.N. GAOR
(2315th plen. mtg.) at 44-45, U.N. Doc. A/PV.2315 (1974) (provisional record).
43. But see deArechaga, State Responsibility for the Nationalization of For-
eign Owned Property, 11 N.Y.U. J. IN'xL L. & Poi. 179, 187-88 (1978) (argues that
Resolution 3281 initially gives the nationalizing state the right to determine the
appropriate compensation, and that an aggrieved party retains the right to de-
clare an international controversy and to seek resolution under the appropriate
international machinery agreed to by the parties).
44. See supra text accompanying notes 16-35.
45. See generally Schwebel, The Effect of Resolutions of the U.N. General
Assembly on Customary International Law, 73 AM. Soc'y INT'L L. PRoc. 301
(1979).
46. See, e.g., 0. LissrrzYN, INTERNATIONAL LAw TODAY AND TOMORROW 34-36
(1965).
47. A United Nations "declaration" is of greater solemnity and significance
than a recommendation. In view of its greater importance,
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In this regard, the lump sum settlements provide the re-
quired concomitant state practice to raise Resolutions 1803 and
3281 to the level of customary international law.4 8 In contrast to
the partial compensation formulation of the lump sum settle-
ments, 4 9 the appropriate compensation formula provides an ac-
cepted legal norm that, because of its greater flexibility, can be
reconciled with the entire range of lump sum settlements.50
Since there is, therefore, a state practice established by the
lump sum settlements to justify reliance on an internationally
recognized right to appropriate compensation, Resolutions 1803
and 3281 satisfy the conditions creating an international cus-
tom. Courts should acknowledge this state practice as evidence
of a new customary international norm so that judicial adjudi-
cation will correspond with the expectations engendered by the
practice.51
The legal status of Resolutions 1803 and 3281 in relation to
the contesting parties in a particular dispute depends upon
whether both parties have accepted the resolutions as estab-
lishing a customary international norm applicable to the matter
it may be considered to import, on behalf of the organ adopting it, a
strong expectation that Members of the international community will
abide by it. Consequently, insofar as the expectation is gradually justi-
fied by State practice, a declaration may by custom become recognized
as laying down rules binding upon states.
Memorandum by the Office of Legal Affairs, Use of the Terms "Declaration"
and "Recommendation," 34 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 8) at 15, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/L.610 (1962), quoted in Schwebel, supra note 45, at 304.
48. The argument against receiving the lump sum agreements as evidence
of a general practice indicating custom is that they represent compromises
based on socioeconomic and political expediencies and, hence, are sui generis,
having no legal effect beyond the unique circumstances creating them. Profes-
sors Lillich and Weston argued, however, that to deny these agreements legal
value because socioeconomic and political constraints influenced them would
frustrate the development of any "general practice." Few international settle-
ments would ever occur without these so-called extra-legal constraints provid-
ing the necessary impetus to settlements of international disputes in the
absence of an international judicial system for resolving them. See 1 R. LILLaCH
& B. WESTON, supra note 33, at 260-63.
For a case which adopted the principle of "partial" compensation partly on
the basis of the lump sum agreements, see Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. S.U.P.O.R.
Co., 22 I.L.R. 23 (Rome, Italy Civ. Ct. 1954). But see The Barcelona Traction,
Light and Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 LC.J. 4, 40 (Judgment of Feb. 5)
(holding that the lump sum compensation agreements, "[f] ar from evidencing
any norm as to the classes of beneficiaries of compensation, ... are sui generis
and provide no guide in the present case").
49. See supra text accompanying note 35.
50. Cf. deArechaga, supra note 43, at 187-89 (viewing the "appropriate"
standard as an equitable principle which, while replacing the orthodox formula-
tion, accommodates it).
51. See supra text accompanying notes 12-13.
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in dispute.52 Faced with a similar problem in a dispute over
Libya's nationalization of properties owned by two interna-
tional oil companies, an international arbitral tribunal resolved
the question of the applicability of Resolutions 1803 and 3281 to
the case by ascertaining the degree of support demonstrated by
other Western and developing countries for each resolution.53
The arbitrator found that a majority of Western and developing
countries supported Resolution 1803, whereas Resolution 3281
had no support among Western countries, and therefore con-
cluded that only Resolution 1803 was applicable to the parties
as customary international law.5 4
Applying a similar approach to the parties in Chase Man-
hattan, there is sufficient support for applying the Resolution
1803 formulation of appropriate compensation, but not the Res-
olution 3281 version. Cuba and most of the other communist
countries abstained in voting for Resolution 180355 and sup-
ported Resolution 3281.56 In contrast, most Western countries,
including the United States, did not support Resolution 3281.57
Although it is arguable that Cuba should not be held to Resolu-
tion 1803 on the theory that a state's decision not to object to
the practice of another state does not demonstrate that state's
acceptance of the practice as law, Cuba's actual practice has
been consistent with the principle of "appropriate compensa-
tion..., in accordance with international law."58 Cuba's bilat-
eral agreements with other Western states concerning the
nationalizations arising out of the Cuban revolution establish
that it has at least tacitly consented to Resolution 1803.59 Thus,
in disputes between Western countries and Cuba, courts
should use Resolution 1803 as the standard to determine a
state's duty under international law to provide compensation
for expropriated property.
No United States court prior to Chase Manhattan had de-
cided which of the competing positions represents the control-
52. See supra text accompanying note 14.
53. Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co. v. The Gov't of the Libyan Arab Re-'
public, reprinted in 17 Int'l Legal Materials 1 (1978) (Dupuy, Arb.).
54. Id. at 29-30.
55. See supra text accompanying note 38.
56. 29 U.N. GAOR (2315th plen. mtg.) at 44-45, U.N. Doc. A/PV.2315 (1974)
(provisional record).
57. See supra text accompanying note 42.
58. See supra text accompanying note 37.
59. See, e.g., infra note 94. For a discussion of tacit consent as a basis for
binding a state to a customary practice, see 1 L. OPPENHns, supra note 10, § 16,
at 25.
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ling standard in international law.60 The Chase Manhattan
court declined to apply either the Soviet bloc or Latin Ameri-
can standards, because they conflict with the more generally
accepted view that international law requires the payment of
some compensation. 61 The court also rejected the partial com-
pensation standard, because it relies on negotiated lump sum
agreements that are based on compromise rather than adjudi-
cation.62 According to the court, the use of negotiated agree-
ments in determining a compensation standard would be
analogous to using the results of settlements in domestic tort
cases to determine the tort victim's substantive rights.63 The
court also reasoned that a partial compensation standard would
deprive the nationalizing state of any incentive to resolve ex-
propriation disputes in a nonadjudicative manner and, hence,
lower still further the amount recovered by claimant states
through negotiated agreements.64 Regarding whether interna-
tional law required full or appropriate compensation, the court
concluded that appropriate compensation probably "would
60. Claims arising out of a foreign nationalization are not generally cogni-
zable in United States courts, because the sovereign immunity doctrine pre-
vents a foreign state from being sued against its will under American
jurisdictional law. See National City Bank of N.Y. v. Republic of China, 348 U.S.
356, 358 (1955). Another obstacle is the so-called act of state doctrine which
bars the judiciary from examining the validity of a foreign sovereign's expropri-
ation of property within its own territory, even when a violation of customary
international law is alleged. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,
428 (1964). Since Sabbatino, however, the United States has created two major
exceptions to the act of state doctrine. The first exception, the Sabbatino
Amendment, provides for judicial determination on the merits, notwithstanding
the act of state doctrine, in a case in which a claim of title or right is asserted
based upon an expropriation of property in violation of international law occur-
ring after January 1, 1959. Foreign Assistance Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-633,
§ 301(d) (4), 78 Stat. 1009, 1013 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e) (2) (1976)). The
second exception was the result of the Supreme Court's decision in First Nat'l
City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972). Although tke major-
ity split three ways on the rationale of the case, Banco Nacional is commonly
regarded as creating a counterclaim exception to the act of state doctrine, lim-
ited to the amount of the foreign sovereign's claim. See, e.g., Menendez v. Saks
& Co., 485 F.2d 1355, 1373 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Alfred
Dunhill of London v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976). The Supreme Court
tacitly approved the counterclaim theory of the holding of Banco Nacional in
Alfred Dunhill of London v. Republic of Cuba, 416 U.S. 981 (1974). See Com-
ment, Rationalizing the Federal Act of State Doctrine and Evolving Judicial
Exceptions, 46 FoRDHAm L. REV. 295, 316 (1977). The Second Circuit relied
upon the counterclaim exception of Banco Nacional to reach the merits of the
present case. 658 F.2d at 884.
61. 658 F.2d at 891.
62. Id. at 892.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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come closest to reflecting what international law requires."65
But the court did not rest its decision on this conclusion, be-
cause it found full and appropriate compensation indistinguish-
able in this case. Reasoning that appropriate compensation did
not necessarily exclude the possibility of requiring full com-
pensation in some cases, the court decided that here full com-
pensation was appropriate. 66 Although the court denied Chase
as much as it had sought, the court nevertheless considered the
bank fully compensated in the sense that its compensation was
"neither more nor less than [was] appropriate in the
circumstances." 67
On the question of the branches' value, the court concluded
that full compensation would not include a premium for the go-
ing concern value.68 Given the economic and political condi-
tions in Cuba at the time of the expropriation, including
measures enacted to abolish private banking in Cuba, the court
considered it unlikely that the branches would have been able
to make a profit, and, hence, an award based on the future
earnings of the branches would be "highly speculative." 69
Although it correctly rejected the other standards, the Sec-
ond Circuit in Chase Manhattan failed to give proper consider-
ation to the term "appropriate" as used in Resolution 1803. The
court's sole contribution was the obvious observation that the
terms "appropriate" and "full" compensation were not neces-
sarily mutually exclusive.7 0 The court avoided, however, the
more difficult task of identifying the factors that place a case in
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 893.
68. The going concern value of an on-going enterprise is a separate meas-
ure of its value, apart from alternative measures such as book value and re-
placement cost. An enterprise's value under the going concern method is
measured by the present value of the income stream which that enterprise is
expected to generate over the foreseeable future. The present value is calcu-
lated by discounting the expected earnings of the enterprise. This may be ex-
pressed as follows:
E(1 + r)
E equals the earnings of the enterprise over i periods and r equals the rate of
return on an investment in that enterprise. Weigel & Weston, supra note 32, at
21. The premium for going concern value at issue in Chase Manhattan refers to
the excess of the amount determined under the above formula over the market
value of the branches' net assets. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Man-
hattan Bank, 505 F. Supp. 412, 460 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), modified, 658 F.2d 875 (2d
Cir. 1981).
69. 658 F.2d at 894.
70. Id. at 892.
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this unique category, which overlaps both appropriate and full
compensation.
The court should have started its analysis by examining
the term "appropriate" in the context of Resolution 1803. The
Resolution provides that appropriate compensation shall be
paid "in accordance with the rules in force in the State taking
such measures in the exercise of its sovereignty and in accord-
ance with international law."''  This phrase illustrates the deli-
cate balance sought by the drafters between preserving the
sovereign right of states to control their natural resources and
protecting the rights of foreign investors.7 2 The predominant
role of the domestic laws of the nationalizing state is indicated
by the requirement that the compensation be "in accordance"
with the nationalizing state's laws. In addition, the history of
the Resolution emphasizes that the law of the nationalizing
state applies in any dispute concerning the amount of compen-
sation payable.7 3 The sovereignty of the nationalizing state,
however, is limited by the requirement that compensation also
comply with international law. Nevertheless, this does not
mean that compensation must be prompt, adequate, and effec-
tive.7 4 Resolution 1803 was a compromise that did not adopt
71. See supra text accompanying note 37.
72. For example, the United Nations representative from the United King-
dom described Resolution 1803 as "a creditable effort to achieve a proper bal-
ance between safeguarding the sovereign rights of people over their natural
resources and the legitimate interests of those prepared to invest capitaL" 17
U.N. GAOR C.2 (834th mtg.) at 228, U.N. Doc. A/C.2/SR834 (1962).
73. Resolution 1803 stemmed from a draft submitted by the Chilean dele-
gation to the United Nations Commission on Permanent Sovereignty Over Nat-
ural Resources, established by G.A. Res. 1314, 13 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 18) at
27, U.N. Doe. A/4090 (1958). The Chilean representative to the Commission, Mr.
Schweitzer, described the significance of the domestic law of the nationalizing
state to the determination of compensation. He believed that the resolution
would require "that disputes concerning compensation . . . be settled in ac-
cordance with the laws of the country in which the nationalization, expropria-
tion, or requisitioning was carried out." 17 U.N. GAOR Commission on
Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources (29th mtg.) at 3, U.N. Doc.
A/AC.97/SR.29 (1962).
The third sentence of paragraph 4 of Resolution 1803, see supra text accom-
panying note 37, requires that in any controversy the national jurisdiction of
the expropriating state shall be exhausted. This prescription presumably
adopts the "local remedies" rule, requiring aggrieved parties to exhaust their
local remedies before they may invoke the jurisdiction of the international
courts. This implies, therefore, that international remedies are preserved. See
17 U.N. GAOR C.2 (846th mtg.) at 298, U.N. Doc. A/C.2/S1R846 (1962) (statement
of Mr. Rajaonarivony). The rule of decision in such cases, however, should be
provided by the domestic law of the nationalizing state, subject only to the re-
quirement that the compensation so determined also conform to international
standards. See infra note 75 and accompanying text.
74. See supra text accompanying note 39.
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the position of either the developed or developing countries.
The reference to international law requires only that the com-
pensation be in accordance with the principles of customary in-
ternational law.75 As the lump sum settlement practice has
demonstrated, customary international law has demanded less
than prompt and adequate compensation for most of this
century.7 6
The reference to municipal and international law in defin-
ing appropriate compensation is a by-product of an attempt by
the drafters to reconcile the twin aims of Resolution 1803.
These aims are to accommodate "the national interest of every
state in exercising authority over and regulating the use of all
forms of property within its territorial competence, and the
common interest of the international community in fostering
the maximum production and flow of wealth across state
boundaries." 77 These twin policy objectives, however, are man-
ifestly conflicting, because the best way to stimulate the flow of
capital across state boundaries is to provide full compensation,
75. The Chilean representative offered the only explanation of the words
"in accordance with international law" during the United Nations debate of
Resolution 1803. The following statement responded to a Soviet argument that
the Chilean draft unduly limited the sovereignty of states:
As to the right to compensation for nationalization, expropriation or
requisitioning, the proposal merely indicated that that right should be
exercised in accordance with the domestic law of the state concerned
and 'in accordance with international law.' A draft resolution, however,
had to include such a clause, for the General Assembly had recom-
mended that the sovereign right of every State to dispose of its wealth
and its natural resources should be respected also in conformity with
international law.
17 U.N. GAOR Commission on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources
(25th mtg.) at 12, U.N. Doc. A/AC.97/SR.25 (1962). The reference to the recom-
mendation of the General Assembly was a reference to the Commission's char-
ter, which required the Commission to give "due regard ... to the rights and
duties of States under international law" in making its recommendations. GA.
Res. 1314, 13 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 18) at 27, U.N. Doc. A/4090 (1958).
The role of international law in the determination of compensation was
also debated in connection with Resolution 3281. See supra text accompanying
notes 40-43. The developed countries argued that the decision of the expropri-
ating country must satisfy standards imposed by international law, including
"generally accepted practice as well as bilateral or multilateral agreements con-
cluded by the expropriating country." 29 U.N. GAOR C.2 (1638th mtg.) at 384,
U.N. Doc. A/C.2/SR.1638 (1974).
76. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
77. Dawson & Weston, supra note 3, at 728 (footnote omitted). The man-
date to the Commission on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources
was to make recommendations for the strengthening of that sovereignty, but
that, in carrying out its mandate, "due regard [was to] be paid... to the im-
portance of encouraging international co-operation in the economic develop-
ment of underdeveloped countries." G-A. Res. 1314, 13 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.
18) at 27, U.N. Doc. A/4090 (1958).
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whereas partial or no compensation is the best way to promote
the interest of the state exercising its sovereign right of nation-
alization.78 A number of writers have suggested that the deter-
mination of the appropriate compensation involves a two-step
analysis. 79 The first step involves valuing the expropriated
property according to a measure that translates the victim's
loss into monetary terms. This decision-the valuation deci-
sion-should promote the common interest of encouraging for-
eign investment.8 0 The second step requires a determination of
the compensation that the nationalizing state owes the de-
prived alien for the previously valued loss. This decision-the
compensation decision-should reconcile the objective of en-
couraging foreign investment with the competing objective of
protecting the nationalizing state's right to exercise sovereignty
over property within its borders.
The first step, the valuation decision, has often been as
controversial as the compensation decision,81 because the for-
mer is as analytically important to the final liability of the na-
tionalizing state as the latter. Most developed states in lump
sum negotiations argue that international law still adheres to
the orthodox full compensation standard.8 2 To accommodate
the orthodox requirement of full compensation demanded by
developed states, most developing states have sought a valua-
tion of expropriated property recognizing nontechnical social
and political variables, such as whether the nationalizing state
is a capital-importing or a capital-exporting state.83 Hence, the
debate over valuation standards centers on whether such non-
technical variables should be considered in the valuation deci-
sion. If, however, only appropriate compensation is required,
rather than compensation representing full value, the valuation
decision should exclude nontechnical factors, because they can
be more appropriately considered in the compensation deci-
sion.8 4 Under a two-step analysis, the valuation decision
merely establishes a benchmark from which the nontechnical
78. See Hu, Compensation in Expropriations: A Preliminary Economic
Analysis, 20 VA. J. INT'L L 61, 94-95 (1979).
79. See, e.g., Smith, Real Property Valuation for Foreign Wealth Depriva-
tion, in 1 THE VALUATION OF NATIONALIZED PROPERTY 134-37 (R Lillich ed.
1972); Muller, supra note 29, at 38.
80. See infra notes 87-91 and accompanying text.
81. See Sweeney, The Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States and the Responsibility of Statesfor Injury to Aliens, 16 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 762, 764 (1965).
82. See Muller, supra note 29, at 42-44.
83. See id. at 44-46.
84. See Smith, supra note 79, at 136.
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socioeconomic or political variables, the compensation factors,
are deducted. This two-step approach allows the adjudicator to
isolate and to consider separately the factors essential to the
accomplishment of the twin policy aims underlying "appropri-
ate compensation... in accordance with international law."85
Even if the valuation standard excludes nontechnical vari-
ables, the question remains as to which technical valuation
standard to adopt for valuing nationalized property. There are
essentially four standards: fair market value, replacement cost,
book value, and going concern value.8 6 If the valuation decision
is to foster the maximum flow of wealth abroad, the loss caused
by the expropriation of a foreign investment must be measured
by the real loss to the investor. The real risk that concerns for-
eign investors is the risk of losing the opportunity to do busi-
ness in the future, an opportunity that expropriation denies
them.87 Replacing lost assets through some measure of re-
placement cost or book value method does not restore the lost
opportunity.88 A market valuation is likewise inadequate, be-
cause a competitive market for expropriated assets does not
likely exist.8 9 Granting the foreign investor going concern
value, however, assures the investor the expected fruits of the
investment. 90 Only going concern value maximizes the inves-
tor's incentive to invest abroad, enhancing the probability that
wealth will flow across state boundaries.91
After determining the value of the expropriated property,
the second step is to decide how much of that value is appro-
priately compensable given the socioeconomic and political fac-
tors involved in the expropriation. 92 Because nationalizations
of foreign-owned property occur under a variety of circum-
85. See supra text accompanying note 37.
86. Muller, supra note 29, at 39.
87. Weigel & Weston, supra note 32, at 29-32.
88. Id. at 16-17.
89. Id. at 17-18.
90. Id. at 33.
91. The United States Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (FCSC) has
relied upon the going concern method to value banks expropriated by Cuba.
Lillich, The Valuation of Nationalized Property by the Foreign Claims Settle-
ment Commission, in 1 THE VALUATION OF NATIONALIZED PROPERTY IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAw 112-15 (IL Lillich ed. 1972). In the case of First National Bank of
Boston, the bank argued before the FCSC that profits of a bank are generated
less by its physical assets than by the quality of intangibles that do not appear
on a balance sheet, because banking is a service-type business. Freidberg &
Lockwood, The Measure of Damages in Claims Against Cuba, in 1 THE VALUA-
TION OF NATIONALIZED PROPERTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 126 (R. Lillich ed.
1972).
92. See supra text accompanying note 84.
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stances, the compensation decision must be flexible and prag-
matic. Furthermore, it should attempt to mitigate the
harshness that payment of full value would have upon a state's
right to nationalize property within its territory. One of the
problems is that the compensation decision comprises factors
that are difficult to translate into monetary terms.9 3 The lump
sum agreements, however, are useful in making this compensa-
tion decision. They are unique sources of precedent that both
judicial and diplomatic decision makers should rely upon for
guidance regarding the weight to assign these nontechnical fac-
tors.94 Richard Lillich and Burns Weston found that from the
onset of World War II to 1971 there were over 150 agreements
93. Dawson and Weston discuss these factors as follows:
Such inquiry should be essentially pragmatic: What, if any, com-
pensation has been offered by the depriving State and in what form?
Will the preferred compensation be sufficient to encourage and main-
tain investment in the same or other sectors of the depriving State if
desired? What is the fair market value of the property taken? What
valuation methods were used and was property depreciation consid-
ered? Should the value of intangible property be included within the
settlement and, if so, of which types? How many alien claimants are
involved? Is the depriving State a "capital importing" or a "capital ex-
porting" nation? Is the claimant State a "capital importing" or a "capi-
tal exporting" nation? What amounts of foreign exchange are available
in each country? What weight should be given to possible currency de-
valuations? What is the gross national product of the depriving State?
What is the earning capacity of the depriving or claimant State vis-a-vis
other nations? Has the depriving State a monocultural economy; if so,
what are the relevant world market fluctuations? Are nationals of the
taking State also deprived? Does the constitution of the depriving
State require compensation for its own nationals? Would high compen-
satory demands be prohibitive to the depriving State? Is it in the inter-
est of the claimant State to promote the social and economic welfare of
the depriving State? How diverse are the investments of the claimants
State's nationals and how many of these are subject to possible future
seizure? Are there assets which the claimant State can seize for com-
pensatory purposes? Can the dispute be partially solved by trading ar-
rangements? Are future profits of the nationalized industry
foreseeable and could some indemnification be readily derived there-
from? Is the tax structure of the depriving State such as to enable
compliance with the compensation claims? Of what character are the
current political relations between the two nations? Given current na-
tional sensitivities on both sides, could a more equitable settlement be
obtained at a future time? Is a final settlement sought or may the is-
sues be subsequently reopened?
Dawson & Weston, supra note 3, at 751-52.
94. In adjudicating United States claims arising out of the Cuban Revolu-
tion, the French-Cuban agreement of 1967 provides a relevant precedent to
guide decision makers. Under that agreement, France received 10,861,532 F as
final liquidation of all French claims arising out of expropriations by the Cuban
government after January 1, 1959. In return, France released Cuba from all fur-
ther responsibility for claims based on the property, rights, and interests af-
fected by the agreement, and Cuba released all French nationals indemnified
under the agreement from all obligations toward the Cuban government con-
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representing the judgments of responsible public officials from
more than thirty nations on the amount of appropriate compen-
sation in various circumstances. 95 By following the precedent
of past agreements, courts would provide uniformity between
judicial and diplomatic decisions regarding the appropriate
compensation in similar factual situations.
Applying the appropriate compensation standard in a two-
step analysis, in which the claimant's compensation equals the
full value of its expropriated property less nontechnical vari-
ables, ensures that international claims adjudicators will con-
sider these variables separately from the valuation decision.
This approach will facilitate international agreement on the
proper valuation standards and compel courts to articulate crit-
ical nontechnical factors. Moreover, as opposed to a single-step
standard requiring full compensation, a two-step standard re-
quiring only appropriate compensation provides courts with
the flexibility required to shape an equitable accommodation
between the conflicting interests of the claimant and the na-
tionalizing state. Such flexibility is necessary to permit inter-
national claims adjudicators to assess the difference in equities
between an expropriation of a foreign investment made when
there was a colonial or quasi-colonial relationship between the
nationalizing state and the investor's state and one made when
the nationalizing state was free and independent.9 6 Further-
more, viewing appropriate compensation as a two-step process
is consistent with current international law as reflected in
United Nations resolutions 97 and the practice of states through
cerning such property, rights, and interests. See 2 1R LmLCH & B. WESTON,
supra note 33, at 343.
A final assessment of the agreement would require knowledge of the adju-
dicated value of the claims paid by the French Commission. The percentage of
adjudicated value paid under past French commissions, however, has varied
from a low of 4.59 percent in the case of the Bulgarian claims program to a high
of 60.6 percent in the case of the Czechoslovakian claims program. B. WESTON,
supra note 34, at 179. In addition, any assessment of the French-Cuban agree-
ment would require an analysis of the value to assign for the waiver of all Cu-
ban claims against French nationals compensated under the agreement. See 1
R. LLLcH & B. WESTON, supra note 33, at 219-28.
95. See note 33 supra.
96. See Amerasinghe, The Quantum of Compensation for Nationalized
Property, in 3 THE VALUATION OF NATIONALIZED PROPERTY IN INTERNATIONAL
LAw 117-19 (R. Lillich ed. 1975).
97. Lillich suggested that subsequent United Nations actions may have
weakened a state's international obligation to pay appropriate compensation
for nationalized property. Lillich, The Valuation of Nationalized Property in In-
ternational Law: Toward a Consensus or More "Rich Chaos"?, in 3 THE VALUA-
TION OF NATIONALIZED PROPERTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 186-90 (R. Lillich ed.
1975). Since Lillich compiled his collection of essays, however, there have been
1982]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
lump sum settlements. 98 Finally, the two-step analysis is not
inconsistent with United States recognition of the orthodox po-
sition, since the orthodox requirement of adequate compensa-
tion does not now, and probably never did, require the payment
of the full value of the expropriated property in all cases.99
The principal flaw in the Second Circuit's analysis was its
failure to distinguish between the valuation and compensation
decisions. Although the court concluded that Chase was enti-
tled to full compensation for the expropriation of its Cuban
two significant developments that may have changed his pessimistic assess-
ment on the future of an international right to appropriate compensation. The
first was the passage of Resolution 3281, which recognized the duty of states to
fulfill their international obligations in good faith, including the payment of ap-
propriate compensation for nationalized foreign property. See supra text ac-
companying notes 40-43. But see Brower & Tepe, The Charter of Economic
Rights and Duties of States: A Reflection or Rejection of International Law, 9
INT'L LAw 295, 305 (1975) (argues that substitution of the precatory "appropriate
compensation should be paid" in Resolution 3281 for the mandatory "shall be
paid" of Resolution 1803 reduces the international obligation to pay whatever
compensation the nationalizing state subjectively thinks appropriate without
regard to international standards). The second involves the on-going efforts of
the United Nations Intergovernmental Working Group to produce a Code of
Conduct for Transnational Corporations, which will include a provision relating
to the duty of states toward transnational corporations upon nationalization of
their property. A draft of the provision formulated by the Chairman of the
Working Group provides:
In the exercise of their sovereignty, States have the right, acting in
the public interest, to nationalize property in their territory. Fair and
equitable treatment of transnational corporations by the countries in
which they operate includes payment of just compensation in the event
of nationalization or other taking of their property, such government
action being undertaken under due process of law, in accordance with
national laws, regulations and administrative practices without dis-
crimination between enterprises in comparable situations and with full
regard to international obligations and contractual undertakings to
which States have freely subscribed.
6 U.N. ESCOR Commission on Transnational Corporations para. 52, U.N. Doc.
E/C.10/AC.2/8 (1978) (footnote omitted). In explaining the phrase "just com-
pensation," the Chairman stated: "The adjective just' refers to the final out-
come of the compensation process rather than to the particular methods and
criteria employed. A just result is to be sought taking into account all relevant
circumstances in each case." Id. Annex para. 6. Thus, the Chairman's use of
the adjective 'just" in place of appropriate was not intended to make a depar-
ture from the all-the-circumstances test embodied in the concept of appropriate
compensation. Nor does the draft dilute the duty of the nationalizing state to
adhere to its international obligations in determining the amount of compensa-
tion.
Paragraph 52 is controversial, however, and the Working Group has so far
failed to agree on a final position. See 7 U.N. ESCOR Commission on Transna-
tional Corporations (Agenda Item 5) para. 19, U.N. Doc. E/C.10/79 (1981).
98. See supra text accompanying notes 48.51.
99. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 18, at § 188(2), which defines "ade-
quate compensation" as requiring compensation equal to full value "unless
special circumstances make such requirement unreasonable."
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branches, the court's valuation of those branches was inconsis-
tent with generally accepted valuation techniques. In measur-
ing full value, courts traditionally disregard the impact on the
value of the expropriated assets caused by acts of the national-
izing state which result in depressing the value of the national-
ized enterprise.10 0 The court could have calculated the
branches' going concern value by reflecting economic condi-
tions in Cuba unaffected by the Cuban government's nationali-
zation plans.101 The court's rejection of going concern value,
however, was putatively based on conditions in Cuba that were
partially due to conduct of the Cuban government, which made
the nationalization of American banks in Cuba predictable long
before the actual taking occurred.10 2 The court's valuation deci-
sion, therefore, necessarily reflected an underlying, but unar-
ticulated, awareness of the existence of nontechnical factors
making payment of going concern value unfair given Cuba's so-
cial and economic conditions.
The court's failure to recognize the two-step nature of the
inquiry implicit in the concept of appropriate compensation led
the court to the erroneous assumption that appropriate com-
pensation was full compensation in this case. By not distin-
guishing between valuation and compensation, appropriate
compensation will formalistically appear equal to full compen-
sation. When nontechnical factors implicitly influence the valu-
ation decision, a court may claim that the victim is receiving
full compensation, although the real value of the expropriated
property is somewhat greater than the compensation received.
The court's avowed adherence to full compensation, de-
spite its apparent awareness of the existence of nontechnical
variables, was in part dictated by the court's rejection of the
100. In defining the term "full value," the Restatement states:
So far as practicable, full value must be determined as of the time of
taking, unaffected by the taking, by other related takings, or by conduct
attributable to the taking state and having the effect of depressing the
value of the property in anticipation of the taking. This does not re-
quire, however, disregard of the effect on market values of the state's
general power to regulate the use of property or the conduct of busi-
ness operations.
Id. at § 188 comment b.
101. For example, the district court used a going concern value and calcu-
lated that value on the basis of weighted average deposits, which reflected the
general economic deterioration in Cuba during 1959-60. The court used a
weighted average to avoid reflecting the decline in the branches' deposits
caused by anticipation of the nationalization of foreign banks, which by mid-
1960 had become obvious to the Cuban public. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Chase Manhattan Bank, 505 F. Supp. 412, 461 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
102. 658 F.2d at 893-94.
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lump sum agreements as guideposts in the field of interna-
tional compensation. In support of its rejection of the lump
sum settlement practice, the court relied on an analogy be-
tween such lump sum settlements and domestic tort settle-
ments, which, in the court's opinion, are an inadequate basis
for determining litigants' substantive rights.103 Unlike domestic
systems characterized by independent decisionmaking and ef-
fective enforcement mechanisms as means to protect substan-
tive rights, international law relies primarily on the parties
themselves for decisionmaking and enforcement of substantive
rights. Thus, because the vital role of lump sum agreements in
creating substantive rights under international law is funda-
mentally different from the litigation-avoidance practice of do-
mestic tort settlements, the Chase Manhattan court's analogy
was inappropriate.
Although the Second Circuit probably reached the correct
result in Chase Manhattan, it did so without clearly enunciat-
ing an analysis supporting that result. Moreover, the decision
avoided the difficult task of formulating a workable process for
determining appropriate compensation. By using the two-step
formula discussed in this Comment, courts can better identify
the nontechnical variables that influence the amount of com-
pensation to which a claimant is entitled for expropriated
property.
103. See supra text accompanying note 63.
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